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Legal Representation on Behalf of Minor Children

Often children become embroiled in litigious matters where decisions pertaining to their primary residency and care, contact and/or emigration, needs to be taken. Eventhough the Children’s Act (38 of 2005) is aimed at also taking into consideration the wishes of minor children, it is often disregarded by a parent/caregiver in want of his/her own need/agenda.Section 10 of the Children’s Act entitles every child to participate in an appropriate way in any matter concerning a child. Section 10 further emphasizes that due consideration must be given to the views expressed by the child concerned. The views expressed by a child should obviously be weighed-up against the age, maturity and stage of development of the child.Section 14 of the Children’s Act entitles every child to be assisted in bringing a matter to Court – the section does not stipulate that a child must be assisted by a guardian in bringing a matter to Court. Section 14 must also be read with section 15, and more specifically section 15(2), listing the persons who may approach a court aimed at the enforcement of rights, and which includes the child affected or involved in a matter to be adjudicated, as well as any person acting in the interest of the child.There is therefore no prohibition on a minor child being legally represented where the best interests of a child are at stake.

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Medical Treatment Of Minor Children

In general, the consent of both parents, holding parental rights and obligations, are not required when a minor child is in need of medical treatment or surgical operation.  Conflict arises when consent by parents (or a parent when the other parent is deceased or cannot be found) or a care-giver are refused. Often conflict arises (especially after divorce) between a main member of a medical aid fund (a parent) and a minor child when the need for medical treatment or surgical operation exists and the other parent, who is the non-member of the medical aid fund, is intimidated by the main member’s refusal and fails to assist the minor child.  Section 129 of the Children’s Act, Act 38 of 2005, addresses the issue of consent to medical treatment or surgical operation. Section 129 distinguishes between children below the age of 12, children aged 12 and older and children aged 12 and older, but who is not sufficiently mature and lacks the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment or surgical operation.  When a child is under the age of 12 years or is over the age of 12, but is insufficient mature or unable to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the medical treatment or surgical operation, the child’s parent, guardian or care-giver may consent – the consent of both parents or care-givers are not required. Should consent be unreasonably withheld, the Minister for Social Development may consent. Section 129(9) also confirms the jurisdiction of a High Court or Children’s Court to grant the necessary consent where consent is refused, alternatively unable to give consent.  The right of the care-giver(s), (who does not specifically hold parental rights and responsibilities), to consent to the medical treatment or surgical operation is confirmed in section 32 of the Children’s Act. The latter section deals specifically with the care of a child by a person(s) who does not hold parental rights and responsibilities (i.e. care-giver).  In circumstances where a child is over the age of 12 and has the maturity and mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment or surgical operation, such a child may grant the necessary consent – even in circumstances where the parent(s), guardian(s) or care-giver(s) withholds consent. This situation may very well give rise to conflict between the minor and the parent(s), guardian(s) or care-giver(s) and may ultimately cause the appointment of legal representation on behalf of a minor child.

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A New Development In Life-Partnerships

In the recent case of Bwanya v Master, the Western Cape High Court developed the law of life-partnerships further. In the past, parties to a life-partnership had no rights, but, recently, the law started liberating itself from the old concept of “no rights” to, slowly but surely, granting parties to life-partnerships more rights. In this matter, the Court had to consider whether the Intestate Succession Act (“ISA”) (regulating the law of inheritance in the absence of a will) was unconstitutional with regard to the silence of ISA with the right of life-partners to inherit from a deceased life-partner under circumstances where the was no will. The Judge made a comprehensive comparative study of the legal development over the years on related issues and discussed, amongst others, the development in medical aid scheme dependents, Muslim-right marriages, recognition of same-sex life-partners and others. The Court came to the conclusion that, if a permanent life-partnership relationship existed, then a surviving partner in such relationship may inherit from the deceased’s estate under circumstances where the deceased left no will. The Court found the lack of the ISA to make provision for life-partners to inherent from a deceased life-partner, under circumstances where there is no will, is unconstitutional. The Court, furthermore, found that the ISA was therefore also discriminatory and that there is no justification for the discrimination in terms of the Constitution. The Court, furthermore, found that the right to equality and dignity, is an important right and that, after the word “spouse” in the ISA, the words “…a partner in a permanent -opposite sex life partnership in which the partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support” is to be read into the Act until and when the legislature amends the Act to, specifically make provision therefore, in an amendment of the ISA.   Conduct of domestic animals/pets: It happens often that owners of pets, more specifically dogs, unintentionally, cause their dogs to break-out from enclosure, as a result of which a member(s) of the public may be attacked and injured by such dog(s). In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the injured person sued the owner of dogs for damages as a result of injuries sustained where the dogs escaped into the street, attack and badly injured a passerby. The owner/defendant defended himself by claiming that as he was not aware of the escaping of the dogs from his property (and therefore not aware until the incident occurred), he was not liable for damages. The specific defense of the owner was that, as somebody else may have caused the dogs to break loose, blame/liability does not vest upon the owner. The Court, in its judgment in favour of the plaintiff/injured person, had the following to say: “Many people in South Africa choose to own animals for companionship and protection. That is their choice, but responsibilities follow in its wake…the reality is that animals can cause harm to people and property in various ways. When they do so and the victim of the actions is innocent of fault for the harm they have caused, the interest of justice require that as between the owner and the injured party it is the owner who should be held liable for that harm…..If anything, with the growth of urban living, the vastly increased number of pet animals, especially dogs, in our towns and cities and the opportunities for harm that they pose, the view of where the interests of justice lie has been strengthened. People are entitled to walk our streets without having to fear being attacked by dogs and, where such attacks occur, they should in most circumstances be able to look to the owner of the dog for recompense”. Owners of dogs should therefore take care in keeping their animals in safe enclosure.         Children’s rights of access to school: In a recent matter, the Free State High Court had to consider the best interests of a child, where the child suffered (and still suffers) from “Behavioural impediments”. The child was a vulnerable child who had been diagnosed with “foetal alcohol syndrome” and suffers from cognitive impairments behavioural disorders and epilepsy. The relevant school and the MEC, Department of Social Development, Free State, was taken to Court by the child’s curator, for the refusal to admit the child to a special-needs school. The respondents opposed the Court application on, amongst other, the basis that it was just to refuse the child access until and when the child had been “cured”. The Free State High Court rejected the defense raised on the basis that the child was effectively being barred from attending school until the respondents were satisfied that she has been cured. The Court was of the view that the respondents lost site of the fact that the child was growing up, was receiving therapy and was on medication. The Court furthermore found that there is no tangible evidence that the child was a danger to other learners. The Court, furthermore, found that the conduct of the respondents were against the core principles of the policy approved by the Ministry of Basic Education, and that the main focus was that all support must be given to a learner to facilitate access to an education without predicaments. The Court, under certain conditions of continued treatment for the child, ordered the enrolment of the child to an identified special needs school in order to cater for her educational needs.      

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Banking Law: National Credit Act

In the recent case of Bwanya v Master, the Western Cape High Court developed the law of life-partnerships further. In the past, parties to a life-partnership had no rights, but, recently, the law started liberating itself from the old concept of “no rights” to, slowly but surely, granting parties to life-partnerships more rights. In this matter, the Court had to consider whether the Intestate Succession Act (“ISA”) (regulating the law of inheritance in the absence of a will) was unconstitutional with regard to the silence of ISA with the right of life-partners to inherit from a deceased life-partner under circumstances where the was no will. The Judge made a comprehensive comparative study of the legal development over the years on related issues and discussed, amongst others, the development in medical aid scheme dependents, Muslim-right marriages, recognition of same-sex life-partners and others. The Court came to the conclusion that, if a permanent life-partnership relationship existed, then a surviving partner in such relationship may inherit from the deceased’s estate under circumstances where the deceased left no will. The Court found the lack of the ISA to make provision for life-partners to inherent from a deceased life-partner, under circumstances where there is no will, is unconstitutional. The Court, furthermore, found that the ISA was therefore also discriminatory and that there is no justification for the discrimination in terms of the Constitution. The Court, furthermore, found that the right to equality and dignity, is an important right and that, after the word “spouse” in the ISA, the words “…a partner in a permanent -opposite sex life partnership in which the partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support” is to be read into the Act until and when the legislature amends the Act to, specifically make provision therefore, in an amendment of the ISA. Conduct of domestic animals/pets: It happens often that owners of pets, more specifically dogs, unintentionally, cause their dogs to break-out from enclosure, as a result of which a member(s) of the public may be attacked and injured by such dog(s). In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the injured person sued the owner of dogs for damages as a result of injuries sustained where the dogs escaped into the street, attack and badly injured a passerby. The owner/defendant defended himself by claiming that as he was not aware of the escaping of the dogs from his property (and therefore not aware until the incident occurred), he was not liable for damages. The specific defense of the owner was that, as somebody else may have caused the dogs to break loose, blame/liability does not vest upon the owner. The Court, in its judgment in favour of the plaintiff/injured person, had the following to say: “Many people in South Africa choose to own animals for companionship and protection. That is their choice, but responsibilities follow in its wake…the reality is that animals can cause harm to people and property in various ways. When they do so and the victim of the actions is innocent of fault for the harm they have caused, the interest of justice require that as between the owner and the injured party it is the owner who should be held liable for that harm…..If anything, with the growth of urban living, the vastly increased number of pet animals, especially dogs, in our towns and cities and the opportunities for harm that they pose, the view of where the interests of justice lie has been strengthened. People are entitled to walk our streets without having to fear being attacked by dogs and, where such attacks occur, they should in most circumstances be able to look to the owner of the dog for recompense”. Owners of dogs should therefore take care in keeping their animals in safe enclosure. Children’s rights of access to school: In a recent matter, the Free State High Court had to consider the best interests of a child, where the child suffered (and still suffers) from “Behavioural impediments”. The child was a vulnerable child who had been diagnosed with “foetal alcohol syndrome” and suffers from cognitive impairments behavioural disorders and epilepsy. The relevant school and the MEC, Department of Social Development, Free State, was taken to Court by the child’s curator, for the refusal to admit the child to a special-needs school. The respondents opposed the Court application on, amongst other, the basis that it was just to refuse the child access until and when the child had been “cured”. The Free State High Court rejected the defense raised on the basis that the child was effectively being barred from attending school until the respondents were satisfied that she has been cured. The Court was of the view that the respondents lost site of the fact that the child was growing up, was receiving therapy and was on medication. The Court furthermore found that there is no tangible evidence that the child was a danger to other learners. The Court, furthermore, found that the conduct of the respondents were against the core principles of the policy approved by the Ministry of Basic Education, and that the main focus was that all support must be given to a learner to facilitate access to an education without predicaments. The Court, under certain conditions of continued treatment for the child, ordered the enrolment of the child to an identified special needs school in order to cater for her educational needs.      

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Retrenchment, your rights, and obligations – Section 189 of the Labour Relations Act.

During our current economic climate which is worsened by the Covid-19 Pandemic retrenchments have become necessary for the continued existence of businesses. This does not mean that an employee is not protected by the law. The main purpose of the Labour Relations Act is to firstly ensure that employees and subjected to fair labour practices but secondly to ensure that as many South Africans as remain employed by setting out procedures for either dismissals or retrenchments. Section 189 states the following: “(1)       When an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons based on the employer’s operational requirements, the employer must consult— (a) any person whom the employer is required to consult in terms of a collective agreement; (b) if there is not collective agreement that requires consultation— (i) a workplace forum, if the employees likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals are employed in a workplace in respect of which there is a workplace forum; and (ii) any registered trade union whose members are likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals; (c) if there is no workplace forum in the workplace in which the employees likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals are employed, any registered trade union whose members are likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals; or (d) if there is no such trade union, the employees likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals or their representatives nominated for that purpose. (2)        The employer and the other consulting parties must in the consultation envisaged by subsections (1) and (3) engage in a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process and attempt to reach consensus on— (a) appropriate measures— (i) to avoid the dismissals; (ii) to minimise the number of dismissals; (iii) to change the timing of the dismissals; and (iv) to mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals; (b) the method for selecting the employees to be dismissed; and (c) the severance pay for dismissed employees. (3)        The employer must issue a written notice inviting the other consulting party to consult with it and disclose in writing all relevant information, including, but not limited to— (a) the reasons for the proposed dismissals; (b) the alternatives that the employer considered before proposing the dismissals, and the reasons for rejecting each of those alternatives; (c) the number of employees likely to be affected and the job categories in which they are employed; (d) the proposed method for selecting which employees to dismiss; (e) the time when, or the period during which, the dismissals are likely to take effect; (f) the severance pay proposed; (g) any assistance that the employer proposes to offer to the employees likely to be dismissed; (h) the possibility of the future re-employment of the employees who are dismissed; (i) the number of employees employed by the employer; and (j) the number of employees that the employer has dismissed for reasons based on its operational requirements in the preceding 12 months. (4) (a) The provisions of section 16 apply, read with the changes required by the context, to the disclosure of information in terms of subsection (3). (b) In any dispute in which an arbitrator or the Labour Court is required to decide whether or not any information is relevant, the onus is on the employer to prove that any information that it has refused to disclose is not relevant for the purposes for which it is sought. (5)        The employer must allow the other consulting party an opportunity during consultation to make representations about any matter dealt with in subsections (2), (3) and (4) as well as any other matter relating to the proposed dismissals. (6) (a)The employer must consider and respond to the representations made by the other consulting party and, if the employer does not agree with them, the employer must state the reasons for disagreeing. (b) If any representation is made in writing the employer must respond in writing. (7)        The employer must select the employees to be dismissed according to selection criteria— (a) that have been agreed to by the consulting parties; or (b) if no criteria have been agreed, criteria that are fair and objective.” To summarize in short there must be a notice served on employees in terms of Section 189(2) informing them of the contemplated retrenchments and what their rights are with regard to the retrenchments. The employee and employer can then engage in a join consensus seeking process which is used to determine how job losses can be minimized by either, inter alia, a reduction in working hours, shift rotations, a reduction in salaries etc.   Employers are obliged to make the following payments in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act when retrenching employees: One week’s salary for every completed year of service (severance); Notice, depending on the length of the employees service. 6 months employment = 1 week notice; 6 – 12 months = 2 weeks notice; 1 year and more = 4 weeks notice; For leave days that employee is entitled to for the 12-month cycle. If a dispute arises about severance pay, such can be referred to the CCMA at anytime as there is no statutory time limit for the referral unlike dismissal and unfair labour practices. Furthermore, employees are entitled to request that the employer furnish to them a UI19 form, which would enable the employee to claim UIF from the Unemployment Fund. In terms of Section 42 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act employers are obligated to also furnish employees with a certificate of service. More often than not, employers will suggest that employees take a voluntary exit package or early retirement for older employees who are closer to retirement.  A recent Labour Court matter namely, National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Others v Aveng Trident Steel , dealt with the question whether employees are automatically dismissed when they refuse changes to terms and conditions of their employment cause by the employer’s operational requirements. The Court found that it is not an

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